Associated consistency, value and graphs

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Associated consistency, value and graphs

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International audience. This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show that its limit is an inessential game. Three axioms (associated consistency, inessential game, continuity) characterize a unique sharing rule. Combinatorial arguments and matrix tools provide a procedure to compute the solution. The new sharing rule coincides with the Shapley value when the communication is complete.

Langue: Anglais

Date de publication: 2019-06-20

Source: ISSN: 0020-7276

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